In the presented article, the author makes an attempt to draw the attention of the scientific community to the problem of regular occurrence in the field of legal science and practice of cases of unjustifiably free, free treatment of traditional legal terminology. On the example of the concept of "gap in law", he demonstrates some of the negative trends that have developed in this area. Among them, first of all, is the desire of a number of modern legal scholars to replace it with the concept of "legal vacuum". The author of the article seeks to understand the reasons for the appearance of ideas of this kind, to assess the degree of their validity.The study of a number of examples of such substitution showed that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is not the result of a rethinking of a phenomenon previously known to legal science, and is not associated with the acquisition of new scientific knowledge. It was not possible to trace any serious theoretical justifications in its basis. In the course of further research, the author of the article refines the content of the concepts of "gap in law" and "legal vacuum".The material obtained as a result of it made it possible to come to the conclusion that each of them reflects a separate independent legal phenomenon. In this regard, in the opinion of the author of the article, the consideration of "legal vacuum" as a synonym or alternative to "a gap in law" is unacceptable. Each of these concepts has its own semantic load. Their mixing contributes to the development of such negative processes as, firstly, the “blurring” of clear boundaries between the phenomena they designate, and secondly, the unreasonable doubling of the conceptual and categorical or partial absence of legal regulations, the need for which is due to the level of development of social relations.
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