The article is devoted to the problems of criminal law protection of objects created by artificial intelligence. The au- thor identifies two main questions in this area - are there grounds for recognizing such objects as objects of copyright and, if so, what should be the regime of their criminal law protection. In order to find answers to these questions, the author conducts a study of existing approaches and concepts in the legislation, judicial practice of various states, as well as in Russian and foreign legal doctrine. The designated problem is considered in the context of various theories of intellectual property. Based on the basic provisions of the utilitarian concept, the author comes to the conclusion that it seems most rational not to recognize the authorship of objects created by artificial intelligence. But as for exclusive rights, they arise from the owner of the artificial intelligence systems that produce these objects. With such a construc- tion, the subject of the crime becomes clear, as well as the victim for the purposes of legal proceedings. The theoretical results obtained by the author can be used as the basis for legislative decisions in the field of criminal law protection of objects created by artificial intelligence units.
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