The article examines the problem of the rule-following, highlighted by Wittgenstein, which gave rise to an extremely wide discussion within the framework of linguistic philosophy. Wittgenstein emphasizes that within the framework of linguistic practices there may be rules that are a criterion for compliance with a particular situation, but the interpretation of the rule can only be a matter of its formulation and is not normatively defined. This formulation of the problem gave rise to a number of ambiguous and contradictory interpretations regarding language practices with a stable normative system, primarily regarding the certainty of legal regulations. As a result, this question is posed more specifically in analytical philosophy and jurisprudence, primarily through the theory of Herbert Hart. The paper concludes that the linguo-philosophical problem of the rule-following takes on a special dimension when the conversation takes place about legal language. Regarding legal concepts and rules, this problem is expressed not only in the complexity of determining the criteria for legal structures and their content, but also in the very reality of the legal system.
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